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NOTES
policy which seeks not to vest the sins of one person upon another. In
recognition of this purpose, it should afford to all such issue, even though
of a "repulsive" alliance, what is undeniably theirs.
Donald J. Prebenda
Evidence
JUDICIAL NOTICE AND THE COMMUNIST PARTY
If one were to ask the average citizen, after he had read his latest
paper or magazine or spent an evening listening to the radio or watching
TV, just what was the biggest news story in America at this time, he
would probably answer that Communism, national and international, and
all that goes with it - Congressional investigations, loyalty programs,
oaths and probes, security measures, etc. - was the chief item of con-
sistent, all-pervading public fear and interest.
This preoccupation with Communism and its effects has also wended
its way into various parts of the judicial process, from prosecutions and
actions under the Smith Act' and Internal Security Act of 1950 2 to
actions for libel and slander for calling someone a Communist. This
article will attempt to delineate the current judicial treatment of one
aspect of this situation - the problem of judicial notice.
Since the conclusion has been reached that the Communist question is
very well known to the average American, can the courts of this country
recognize such notoriety and take judicial notice of the aims, ends, and
purposes of the Communist Party and also its control if any, by sources
foreign to this country? The importance of this question and its answer,
to be fully developed later, is evident when it is considered that if such
doctrine were applied many people would lose their jobs for violations of
their oaths of loyalty, and others would automatically be cast as felons
as violators of criminal syndicalism laws of the various states. In addi-
tion, the administration of justice would be greatly aided, as is shown by
the fact that most of the nine months of trial and many of the 16,000
pages of testimony could have been dispensed with in the case of Dennis
v. United States,3 had judicial notice been used.
This article then will be an attempt to present a short history of the
use of judicial notice in regard to the doctrines, aims, and purposes of the
Communist Party in the United States. Special emphasis will be placed
on the doctrine of overthrow of the government by force and violence,
1 18 U.S.C. § 2385 (Supp. 1952).
2 64 STAT. 987 (1950) ; 50 U.S.C. § 781 et seq. (Supp. 1952).
3 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
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which is supposedly a chief tenet of the party and is the focal point of
the court's attention in the majority of the cases as involving possible
violation of various statutes. This history will include most of the cases
wherein these doctrines have been at all considered and also necessarily
many of the cases setting forth, on the basis of evidence, just what those
doctrines are.
-The first consideration in order is to examine briefly the nature of the
doctrine called "judicial notice." Judicial notice of a fact is a rule of evi-
dence that dispenses with the necessity of offering evidence as to such
fact.4 It is a judicial shortcut used when there is no real need for evidence.
This only occurs, though, when several prerequisites are present. As
stated by the court in Communist Party of United States v. Peek: 5
Before a court will take judicial notice of any fact, however, that fact
must be a matter of common and general knowledge, well established and
authoritatively settled, not doubtful or uncertain. The test is whether suffi-
cient notoriety attaches to the fact to make it proper to assume its existence
without proof.
If there is any doubt whatever, either as to the fact itself or as to its
being a matter of common knowledge, evidence must be required, and
judicial notice can never be used where there is a possibility of dispute
regarding the fact.6
These are the criteria which must be used in considering the use of this
doctrine which dispenses with the necessity of proof through evidence.
It must never be forgotten that the basis of this doctrine lies in con-
venience and sometimes in necessity. Because the standard must thus be
very high, judicial notice should be used with great caution. This basis
and its accompanying standard must be constantly applied in the follow-
ing discussion.
The problem of determining the aims and doctrines of the Communist
Party has plagued the courts of this country for over thirty years. The
first cases to pass on this question were deportation cases under the Im-
migration Act of 1918, 7 which provided that aliens who were members of
or affiliated with organizations which believed, taught, or advocated the
overthrow of the government by force or violence were to be excluded
and deported from this country. In each case the alien involved was a
member of the Communist Party and on this basis an attempt was made
to deport him. The courts then proceeded to examine the various publi-
4 Neville v. Kenney, 125 Ala. 149, 157, 28 So. 452,454 (1900).
5 20 Cal.2d 536, 127 P.2d 889, 895-6 (1942).
6 Varcoe v. Lee, 180 Cal. 338, 181 Pac. 223, 225 (1919).
7 40 STAT. 1012 (1918), 8 U.S.C. § 137 a-c, repealed, 66 Stat. 279 (1952).
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cations, magazines, books and pamphlets trying to ascertain the real
nature and purpose of the party. One of the first of these cases, involving
twenty aliens, was Colyer v. Skeffington,8 in which the court in a very
long and exhaustive opinion concluded that the party's inefficient organi-
zation, small membership, as well as its avowed purposes, excluded the
possibility of violence and force; that while the party did advocate
radical change it was not by destruction and sabotage, the party using
rather the general strike as the most severe of its weapons; and that it
was more concerned with spreading its propaganda via words and not
violent deeds.
This was the last word spoken in behalf of the party in a long time.
This case was reversed in the circuit court on appeal, and the later cases,9
citing each other as precedents, all ruled that the evidence, as based
principally on the manifesto and program of the Communist Party, was
of such a character as would easily lead a reasonable man to conclude
that the purpose of the Communist Party was the capture and destruction
of the state via force and violence, and that thus membership in this
party was grounds for deportation of alien members. The immigration
law has now been changed so that it specifically states that membership
in the Communist Party is valid grounds in and of itself for deportation
of an alien.10
It must be carefully noted that though the above cases were the first
to deal extensively with the doctrines, aims, and purposes of the Com-
munist Party they were decided on the basis of evidence, either that of
the party's publications as to what their aims were, or on the basis of its
acts in a particular instance. The first case in which an attempt was made
to take judicial notice of these aims and purposes distinguished the above
cases and their holdings on that very point. The court in Ex parte Fier-
stein1 granted an application for a writ of habeas corpus holding that
the testimony of a private detective, who had been a party member for
some time, as to the violent aims of the party was insufficient to justify
deportation on the grounds specified. Furthermore, the court would not
take judicial notice of the character of the Communist Party, as con-
tended for by the government, because no authority was cited for its use.
Rather, it was pointed out that while this subject was considered by the
8 265 Fed. 17 (D. Mass. 1920), rev'd, Skeffington v. Katzeff, 277 Fed. 129 (1st
Cir. 1922).
9 Kjar v. Doak, 61 F.2d 566 (7th Cir. 1932); Sormunen v. Nagle, 59 F.2d 398
(9th Cir. 1932); MurdQch v. Clark, 53 F.2d 155 (1st Cir. 1931); Antolish v. Paul,
283 Fed. 957, 959 (7th Cir. 1922); United States ex rel. Fortmueller v. Commissioner,
14 F. Supp. 484 (S.D.N.Y. 1936); In re Saderquist, 11 F. Supp. 525 (D. Me. 1935),
aff'd sub nom. Sorquist v. Ward, 83 F.2d 890 (1st Cir. 1936); United States ex rel.
Lisafeld v. Smith, 2 F.2d 90 (W.D.N.Y. 1924); United States ex tel. Abern v. Wallis,
268 Fed. 413 (S.D. N.Y. 1920).
10 66 STAT. 205, 8 U.S.C.A. § 1251 (Supp. 1952).
11 41 F.2d 53 (9th Cir. 1930).
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cases cited, it had been done on the basis of evidence, no-court having
attempted to take judicial notice of the party's fundamental aims.
During the same year (1930) in a government suit to vacate a natural-
ization order on grounds of fraud, the court surmised in dicta12 that the
lower court could have taken judicial notice of the general principles of
the party, but that if he could not, there was evidence enough already to
satisfy the requirements (though he was sure that there must be shades
of adherence among Communists). Seemingly in agreement with this dicta
is another United States circuit court case 13 where the court merely said
that the Communist Party is "well known to be a group that advocates
the overthrow of organized government by force." Since there appears to
be no direct evidential basis for this conclusion, the court without saying
so is taking judicial notice of the character of the party. It must be said
though that such conclusions could well have been based on the similar
cases with an evidential basis discussed above. From the standpoint of
common knowledge and the contrary holdings of other courts it seems too
early for this doctrine to have taken effect.
The case of Strecker v. Kessler14 seemed to take the opposite view in
that it held that mere membership in the Communist Party was not
sufficient grounds for deportation. This decision was based on the follow-
ing rationale: This immigration statute when enacted was affected by the
tremor of the times, which meant that the Congress, after a consideration
of the recent revolution in Russia set a policy of exclusion from this
country of those involved. The early cases were likewise based on this
policy, but now, times have changed, Russia itself prohibiting the over-
throw of its government by the application of force. The court stated that
the party is a political party and uses peaceful means of change, and that
thus on the little evidence adduced there was not a sufficient basis to find
that the party in 1933 did teach, incite, or advocate the overthrow of the
government by force and violence. On rehearing,5 the reversal for the
petitioner was modified to try the issue de novo, but the dissenting
justice strongly urged the use of judicial notice in the first real attempt
to apply that doctrine to these principles, since the violent purposes and
aims of the Communist Party were of such current history as to be of
common notoriety in the community. He cites the historical facts behind
the establishing of the Third International by revolutionary tactics as an
example, and concludes that the use of the doctrine of judicial notice
would provide the necessary basis to show a violation of the statute. The
Supreme Court, 16 however, deciding the case on other grounds, expressly
did not pass on the propriety of the court's taking judicial notice of the
12 United States v. Tapolcsanyi, 40 F.2d 255, 257 (3d Cir. 1930).
13 United States ex rel. Yokinen v. Commissioner, 57 F.2d 707 (2d Cir. 1932).
14 95 F.2d 976, mnodified, 96 F.2d 1020 (5th Cir. 1938), aff'd, 307 U.S. 22 (1939).
15 Strecker v. Kessler, 96 F.2d 1020, 1021 (5th Cir. 1938).
16 Kessler v. Strecker, 307 U.S. 22, 33 (1939).
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purposes and aims of the Communist Party. It did, though, hold as
erroneous the lower court's view concerning the background of the stat-
ute as originating in an attempt to protect us from the effects of the
Russian revolution.
'II
Following chronologically, the next cases that discussed the question
of judicial notice and the Communist Party seemed again to group them-
selves, this time in the field of politics. Their. conclusion was at variance,
however, with that of the deportation cases decided previously. In State
ex rel. Huff v. Reeves,17 a mandamus action was started to compel the
Secretary of State to file the certificates of nomination of the Communist
Party. She had refused to do so claiming that the party's declaration was
at variance with its real aim of world domination. The court held that the
Secretary exceeded her power in this regard. Basing its decision in part
on the state's criminal anarchy statute, the court stated that it would be
impossible to take judicial notice of facts that would make these persons
felons as violating this statute prohibiting advocating of the overthrow
of the government by force and violence. The court distinguished the
earlier deportation cases in that the administrative agency there involved
had a quasi-judicial power and the power to take and weigh evidence.
The three dissenting justices, however, felt that judicial notice should be
taken as in the other decided cases, and that the common knowledge of
the average person points out that the real purpose of Communism is to
destroy and overthrow the government of the United States by force and
violence; thus we should not protect such people by extending the
privileges and immunities of citizens to those who would destroy these
liberties, laws and privileges.
In a similar case much later in Ohio,' 8 where the filing of petitions of
presidential electors was denied on the ground, inter alia, that three of
the signers were members of the Communist Party, the court, in ordering
the writ of mandamus to be issued, held that it is a matter of common
knowledge that there are members of the Communist Party who do not
wish to overthrow the government by force but who desire to accomplish
the ends they have in view by constitutional means. Therefore it was a
matter of proof as to each party member's views on this topic.
17 5 Wash.2d 637, 106 P.2d 729 (1940). Restrictions on access to the election
process have taken two principal forms: (1) the exclusion of a party from the ballot
(used by 15 states and territories), (2) requirements that candidates for public office
meet certain qualifications or take some kind of loyalty oath (ten states have restric-
tions 6f this type), EmERsox AND HABER, POLITICAL AND CiVIL RIGHTs IN THE
UmwTFD STATES 516 (1952).
18 State ex rel. Beck v. Hummel, 150 Ohio St. 127, 80 N.E.2d 899 (1948). Contra
to these last cases on similar facts is Field v. Hall, 201 Ark. 77, 143 S.W.2d 567
(1940), which, however, was based on evidence.
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California, too, has followed the lead of the Washington court and in
Communist Party of the United States v. Peek, held invalid as an un-
reasonable condition for participation in elections a statute providing
that no party connected with the Communist Party or using the word
"communist" could be qualified to participate in an election. The court
flatly stated that applying the standards set out, supra, the doctrine of
judicial notice has no part in this case as this is not a proper subject for
its use. If judicial notice were to be taken that the Communist Party
advocates the use of force and violence, this would not only be the noting
of a fact that is denied by the party i.e. the subject is disputable, but also
it would necessitate a finding that every registered Communist is a felon
and could be convicted of a violation of the criminal syndicalism law
upon mere proof of membership in the party.
These arguments, first presented in the above cases, continue to be
valid today as reasons why judicial notice should not be used in this
field. (1) By this method and without proof men would become felons as
violating various state and federal anarchy and syndicalism statutes; and
(2) There appears to be some dispute as to just what are the doctrines,
aims and purposes of the Communist Party especially as regards their
attempt to overthrow the government by force and violence.
A line of argument that was also developed about the same time as the
above cases is well illustrated by Feinglass v. Reinecke,'9 where an action
was instituted against the board of election commissioners to compel
them to place the names of the Communist candidates on the ballots.
The commissioners bad refused on the grounds of a statute which said
that no political organization which associates with Communists, fascists,
or other un-American principles or engages in activities directed toward
overthrow of the government by force and violence would be a qualified
party or be given a place on the ballot. The court, while denying injunc-
tive relief as useless because of the inability to print new ballots in the
short time before the election, agreed with the plaintiffs that the mere
similarity in name of the party was not sufficient to show that it had
violated the statute. Turning then to the dictionary the court showed
that communism meant either a theory of government under which goods
and the instruments of production are held in common, or the principles
of the Communist Party, especially that of the party in Russia. There-
fore, if the term Communist is taken to mean the former, the statute is
unconstitutional. If it means the latter, assuming that the principles of
the Communist Party are held to be other than the holding in common of
the instruments of production, then the statute is void for uncertainty,
vagueness and indefiniteness. The court concludes that just because one
party advocates another type of economic system does not mean that it
should be excluded from the ballot. However, it is to be noted that the
19 48 F. Supp. 438 (N.D. IlM. 1942).
NOTES
court does not express any opinion or even mention the possibility of the
party achieving its economic system by force or violence but passes over
this point entirely.
Other cases have used this same argument of vagueness and uncertain-
ty as to just what the word "Communist" means. In United States v.
Hautau,20 a demurrer to the indictment was sustained where it was
alleged that the defendant had filed a false affidavit that he was not a
Communist when in fact he was. The court held that the term itself was
too vague and uncertain as used in the act and consequently was re-
pugnant to the Fifth Amendment. It stated that one could not be certain
if Communism threatened the world because no one is sure just what it
means to begin with, even the dictionary being of little help. The court
made a survey on this subject among many intelligent, responsible men
and received such varying answers so as to lead it to conclude that the
minds of men do not agree or meet in general acceptance of its import,
making it unable to give a reasonably certain inclusive definition of the
word.
In Florida,2 1 a distinction is made between communism and criminal
communism. A person subscribing to the latter is one who advocates or
teaches the overthrow of the government by force, violence, sabotage,
etc. The court said that there was a clear distinction between these two
parties, one being a legal political party having had national and state
tickets for many years and never considered to be a criminal communist
organization. The distinction proposes another argument which can be
used against the taking of judicial notice by the courts in these cases.
This argument is simply that the party has been given a legal status by
many states. With this legal shield in the hands of the party, courts feel
adverse to taking judicial notice of anything that would reflect on or be
adverse to the finding by the legislatures that such parties are worthy
of a citizen's vote.
Typical of this stand is a New York case 2 2 which held that it was not
libelous per se to say that the plaintiff was affiliated with the Communist
Party. It was reasoned that while the party possessed a legal status, and
20 43.F. Supp. 507 (D.N.J. 1942).
21 State ex 'el. Benemovsky v. Sullivan, 37 So.2d 907, 909 (Fla. 1948). Other
cases showing that the word Communist is vague or capable of varied definitions
include: Spanel v. Pegler, 160 F.2d 619 (7th Cir. 1947) (dissent); United States v.
Schneider, 45 F. Supp. 848 (E.D. Wis. 1942).
22 Garriga v. Richfield, 174 Misc. 315, 20 N.Y.S.2d 544 (Sup. Ct. 1940). Accord,
that it is not slanderous per se to call a person a Communist, Keefe v. O'Brien, 203
Misc. 113, 116 N.Y.S.2d 286 (Sup. Ct. 1952). The court here held that it could take
judicial notice of the cold war existing between our government and governments
espousing Communism. Thus our safety is best served by exposure of Communists
through any means possible. Contra, as to defamation via libel, Mencher v. Chesley,
297 N.Y. 94, 75 N.E.2d 257 (1947) and cases cited therein. For a discussion of this
particular problem see 29 Notre Dame Law. (1953).
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its corresponding rights, it can not be defamatory to say that one is
associated with it. The court, despite its questioning of control by out-
side force and the doctrines of forcible overthrow of the government
espoused in Communist publications, yet states that the judiciary cannot
interfere, since this is a legislative question and the judiciary does not
want to deal with the rights of discussion and political affiliation.
Thus far it has been seen that the early deportation cases, which found
the purposes of the party to be the overthrow of the government by force
and violence and the establishment of international communism, were
based, in the main, on the evidence that was adduced in administrative
hearings before a quasi judicial official. The later cases, however, in the
thirties and early forties, both those that were the first to be truly based
on judicial notice as well, as those that only considered the nature of the
party, came to the conclusion that either judicial notice could not be
taken of this subject or that the party had a completely different and
supposedly peaceful nature. The highwater mark of this line of thought
which could be termed the "pro-Communist" period was reached in the
leading case of Schneiderman v. United States,23 in which an attempt
was made to cancel Schneiderman's certificate of citizenship on the
grounds that he had not been attached to the principles of the Constitu-
tion as required by statute when he was naturalized twelve years before,
being instead a member of an organization which advocated the over-
throw of the government by force and violence. The only evidence against
him was his admitted membership and leadership in the Communist
Party. The prosecution attempted to prove his guilt by imputing to him
the doctrines of the party as set forth in many party publications and
in the testimony of former members. The court, after examining all the
evidence, ruled that the government had not established the requisite
standard of clear, convincing, and unequivocal proof. It struck down the
attempted application of the doctrine of guilt by association stating that
one is not necessarily not attached to the Constitution because he advo-
cated radical changes. 24 However, as to the evidence, which the govern-
ment admitted was conflicting, that the Communist Party advocated the
overthrow of the government by force and violence, the court found it
unnecessary to decide "what interpretation of the Party's attitude to-
ward force and violence is the most probable on the basis of the present
record .... ,, 25 However, earlier in the opinion 26 the court went out of its
way to explain away the words of force and violence in the Communist
publications as a result of peculiar historical situations belonging to the
times in which they were written. The court also "fell" for the now
demonstrated Communist line of stating in their constitution that they
23 320 U.S. 118 (1943).
24 Id. at 137.
25 Id. at 158.
26 Id. at 155-7.
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were against force and violence. The court drew a tenable conclusion 7
that the party desires to achieve its purposes by peaceful and constitution-
al means and would use force and violence only as a last resort when
constitutional means were useless or as a means of self-protection once
they were in power. The dissent,28 on the other hand, was able to draw
but one conclusion from the evidence, namely, that the party advocated
the use of force and violence to establish its aim of world domination.
This decision was a severe blow to those who advocated that the doc-
trines and aims of the Communist Party were of such common knowledge
that judicial notice could be taken of them. For now the Supreme Court
itself, presented with complete factual evidence of the party's activities,
had not only refused to decide what the party's aims and methods were,
but had definitely implied that the Communists were simon-pure and
only a group of theoretical dreamers. Certainly judicial notice could not
be used where evidence itself was inadequate.
IV
But how the pendulum has shifted! The ten short years since the
Schneiderman decision have seen a complete reversal of opinion, both
lay and legal, in this small segment of the legal world. Moving from and
despite the Supreme Court's opinion, the judiciary and legislatures rapid-
ly fell into what might be termed an "anti-Communist" period that is
understandably still going on. Here indeed is a splendid example of how
usually very slow moving judicial change was infected with the swift
temper of the times which inturnwas caused by a rapid change of histori-
cal and political events that saw Communism, as used synonymously
with Russia, turn from ally against Fascist aggression to become the
object of a nationwide purge, from labor to the churches and back, deem-
ed by some to border on the stage of witchhunts. This is a subject,
though, that would necessarily mirror such changes, for a growing aware-
ness of a fact soon results in common knowledge. For that matter could
one dare to surmise that the decision in the Schneiderman and other
wartime cases were those of political expediency and were given tongue
in cheek so as not to offend our powerful allies at a time when common
unity was so strongly needed?
The beginnings of this switch was seen in such cases as In re
Mackay,29 in which a petition for the naturalization of a Communist
27 Id. at 157.
28 Id. at 170, 196.
29 71 F. Supp. 397 (N.D. Ind. 1947). Another early case which followed both the
majority and minority opinions in the Schneiderman case was Stasiukevich v.
Nicolls, 168 F.2d 474 (1st Cir. 1948) which accepts the minority view as to guilt by
association but also states in a note that a court may not as a matter of indisputable
fact judicially notice that the Communist Party advocates the use of force and
violence as this is a matter of proof. However, it is stated that perhaps a reasonable
man could have so found.
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Party member was denied on the grounds that he was a member of an
organization that advocates the overthrow of the government. The court,
while basing its opinion mainly on evidence, such as party publications
submitted at the hearing, nevertheless stated that a court could take
judicial knowledge of the historical fact that Communism advocated
force and violence and the dictatorship of the proletariat and that it is
common knowledge that the American party's activities are shaped by
external forces; further that the resort to democratic processes and the
statement of them as found in their constitution is a mere sham and a
party line. The conclusion was reached that thus a party member could
not be attached to the principles of the Constitution.
A year later, 1948, the courts entirely broke away from the require-
ment of evidence where the purposes of the party are in question. The
case was that of National Maritime Union of America v. Herzog,30 which
considered the constitutionality of the non-Communist affidavit require-
ments of the Labor Relations Management Act of 1947. 31 The court in
dismissing the complaint held that the statute was constitutional as
based on the legislative finding that industrial unrest would be fomented
and the country injured by political strikes instituted by the party in
conformance with the party's nature and purposes. There was thus a
basis for the statute in preventing a clear and present danger to the
national economy. The court took judicial notice that the purpose of the
party is to spread Communism throughout the world and that one of its
methods is to create economic unrest and disturbances in a democracy by
means of such strikes. It was stated that,3 2 "Evidence in a judicial pro-
ceeding is not needed to establish these as primary objectives." The his-
tory of the last few years establishes them beyond contradiction. The
Communist Party, then, is a fifth column for Russia and nothing more.
Accordingly, no more evidence is needed than this as to the possible
future actions of the party members here. The dissenting justice 38 severely
criticized the majority because in the light of the Schneiderman case he
does not think that the court should take judicial notice of facts on which
the Supreme Court could not make a clear decision after an exhaustive
examination of evidence. He states: judicial notice could not be taken
that the program of the party is such that any member is by the fact
alone a clear and present danger to the public interest in the public rela-
tions field; rights under the First Amendment should not be abridged on
this basis and on the mere acceptance of legislative findings of fact with-
out an independent judicial review of their basis; a court should not give
heed to waves of public opinion in its dealing with constitutional rights.
30 78 F. Supp. 146 (D.D.C.), aff'd per curiam, 334 U.S. 854 (1948).
31 61 STAT. 136 (1947) 29 U.S.C. §§ 141 et seq. (Supp. 1952).
32 National Maritime Union v. Herzog, 78 F. Supp. 146, 170 (1948).
33 Id. at 184.
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The opinion expressed in this dissent was the last heard against the
taking of judicial notice of the Communist Party aims and doctrines. The
courts themselves - rightly or wrongly - have been engulfed by the
waves of popular opinion alluded to above. Typical of the few courts
which have mentioned and decided this question is the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania which stated flatly in a very recent cases4 that courts have
at long last taken notice of the fact that Communism is a political move-
ment which is dedicated to the overthrow of the Government of the
United States, and incidentally each state, by force and violence. In this
case it was held that the school board was justified in the discharge of a
teacher for being a member of the Communist Party and for advocating
or participating in un-American or subversive activities or doctrines in
violation of the statute of the public schools.
In one of the best expositions of today's view on the subject the court
(the concurring opinion severely criticized the Schneiderman decision)
explained 3 5 that it would be absurd to continue to submit to various
juries a question so readily and authoritatively settled from the mere
perusal of writings of the acknowledged founders of the party and said
that both general knowledge and accepted history have made these mat-
ters of such general notoriety as to be proper subjects for the doctrine of
judicial notice.
The other courts referred to in this last case were, in the main, earlier
pronouncements of its own which either recognized that judicial notice
had been taken or sustained such action by lower court.36 The leading
case upon which the others are based is Pawell v. Unemployment Com-
pensation Board,3 7 which in taking notice of the Communist Party's
policies as a basis for the discharge of administrative employees for de-
linquency in their duties stated: 38
What the policy of the Communist Party is, does not appear from the
evidence. But courts have long recognized and have taken judicial notice
that Communism, as a political movement, is dedicated to the overthrow
of the Government of the United States ... by force and violence....
For ourselves, we are not willing to say that courts are such impotent
instruments of government that they may not take judicial notice of facts
so well known to the man on the street.
However, the fundamental error in this case and the others in this
state that build on it and then on each other as precedent is that the
court cites as authority the deportation cases considered first in this
article which have already been discredited as absolutely uncitable for
34 Appeal of Albert, 372 Pa. 13, 92 A.2d 663 (1952).
35 Id., 92 A.2d at 665-6.
36 Matson v. Margiotti, 371 Pa. 188, 88 A.2d 892 (1952); Commonwealth v.
PeAy, 369 Pa. 72, 85 A.2d 425, 429, 434 (1951) (See dissent in particular) ; Milasino-
vich v. Serbian Progressive Club, 369 Pa. 26, 84 A.2d 571 (1951).
37 146 Pa. Super. 147, 22 A.2d 43 (1941).
38 Id., 22 A.2d at 45.
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the proposition stated because they were based on evidence and on the
findings of a quasi-judicial agency. This error is then continued by the
later courts in this state who cite Pawell and the cases cited therein.
3 9
However, similar cases that have recently decided to take judicial
notice cannot be partially discredited. They are so few in number that
most can be mentioned. The broad basis underlying the present trend is
indicated in a brief dictum in one case: 40 the American public has be-
come increasingly aware of the dangers of international Communism as
a threat to their domestic institutions and as a menace to their peace and
security. The methods of deception used and the ruthlessness and un-
scrupulousness of the communists are also matters of common knowledge.
The other cases are of a similar vein. Carlson v. Landon,41 was a late
deportation case in which the main issue was whether bail could be denied
to an alien pending deportation proceedings, when held primarily on the
basis of his active Communist Party membership. One argument citing
the Schneiderman case, was that there was no showing that the party
wanted to maim and destroy the government. The circuit court, though,
said that this was a matter of yesterday and that the courts were not in
a vacuum and must be acquainted with current history. Thus they knew
of the existence as of today of a world-wide conspiracy against free
democratic government by a major world poiver using as its vehicle the
establishment of communism by force and violence. A similar recent de-
portation case,42 in holding that membership in the Communist Party,
past and present, was per se grounds for deportation, stated flatly that
"the time has passed when it can be successfully contended that proof is
required that the Communist Party is or has been an organization which
advocates 'the overthrow by force or violence of the Government of the
United States.'"
The variety of the situations in which this doctrine has been enunci-
ated and used is illustrated by the case43 in which it was held not pre-
judicial to ask a witness on cross examination whether or not he was a
member of the Communist Party, as this is a competent question in test-
ing the credibility of a witness. The court stated that gradually the
fundamental principles of the Communist Party have become matters of
common knowledge and that thus the judges and courts will not shut their
39 See note 36 supra. However, if this is the policy of the state the case of Mc-
Andrew v. Scranton Republican Pub. Co. 364 Pa. 504, 72 A.2d 780 (1950) is erron-
eous. There it was held that it was not defamatory to call a person a Communist or
Socialist. The court quoted from the dictionary and party platform, concluding that
the parties were similar, their objectives the same, and the platforms lawful.
40 Weinstock v. Ladisky, 197 Misc. 859, 98 N.Y.S.2d 85, 102 (Sup. Ct. 1950).
41 187 F.2d 991, 997 (9th Cir. 1951), aff'd, 342 U.S. 524 (1951).
42 Martinez v. Neelly, 197 F.2d 462, 465 (7th Cir. 1952).
43 Fawick Airflex Co. v. United Electrical, R. & M. Wkrs., 87 Ohio App. 371, 92
N.E.2d 436, dismissed, 154 Ohio St. 106, 93 N.E.2d 409 (1950).
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minds to the truth that all others can see as, for example, that their
religious theories (if any) are vastly different than ours. It is thus a
competent question to ask witnesses if they feel bound by their oath.
V
And what has the Supreme Court to say on the subject? The severest
judicial indictment of the Communist Party is found in American Com-
munications Ass'n v. Douds,44 in which the Court affirmed the decision
given in the National Maritime Union case discussed, supra, holding
likewise that Congress may reasonably find that the Communist Party
members, unlike members of other parties, represent a continuing danger
of disruptive political strikes when they hold positions of union member-
ship and thus that the anti-Communist affidavits are constitutional. Mr.
Justice Jackson in his concurring and dissenting opinion45 answers an
argument that has been noticed before, namely, that ihe Communist
party is a duly recognized political party in many of the states, and as
such cannot be recognized as otherwise by th6 courts. Jackson, on the
basis of much material he has studied, shows that the Communist Party
is something different from any other party and so constitutionally may
be treated differently in law. He concludes that Congress on the basis of
all -this information and material as to the nature of the party could
conclude that the party is a "revolutionary junta, organized to reach
ends and to use methods which are incompatible with our constitutional
system." 46 The Justice never once alludes to the use of judicial notice,
basing all his conclusions on evidence, though he admits that 'much of
this material would be of doubtful admissibility or credibility in a judi-"
cial proceeding.47 Congress recognized these various principles when it
enacted the Internal Security Act of 1950 (McCarren Act) .48
The dissent in a later Supreme Court case,49 in considering the At-
torney General's list of subversive organizations, stated that Communism
is well understood to mean a group seeking to overthrow the government
of the United States and that accepted history teaches that revolution
by force and violence are the means to be used to gain this end. How-
ever, the case that is thought by many to dispose of the issue of judicial
notice is Dennis v. United States, which held the Smith Act constitution-
al. Much emphasis has been placed on the words of Mr. Justice Frank-
44 339 U.S. 382 (1950).
45 Id. at 422.
46 Id. at 424. Jackson also concludes, 339 U.S. 425-431, that: The goal of tLe
Communist Party is to seize powers of government by and for a minority rather
than through free elections; that the Communist Party is dominated by a foreign
government; violent and undemocratic means are methods to attain the Party's
goal; every member of the Party is an agent to execute this program.
47 Id. at 424 n.2.
48 See Part VI, infra.
49 Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 195 (1951).
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furter in his concurring opinion in which he states: 50 "We may take
judicial notice that the Communist doctrines, which these defendants
have conspired to advocate, are in the ascendency in powerful nations
who cannot be acquitted of unfriendliness to the institutions of this
country." However, he also went on to say that we may take account of
evidence brought forward at this trial and elsewhere, much of which had
been common knowledge, and thus justify a congressional conclusion as
to the danger to the national security. He further 51 limited the use, if
any, of judicial notice in this case by showing that the jury had con-
cluded any inquiry into the nature, organization, aims and methods of
the party by its verdict which found that the party was opposed to non-
violent constitutional processes. Mr. Justice Jackson also describes52 the
methods of the party, pointing out that the party only advocates force
when it is prudent and profitable.
But can this case be said to stand for the proposition that judicial
notice is now taken of the aims and doctrines of the Communist Party,
with particular emphasis on their use of force and violence? While cer-
tainly it clearly sets forth all these items as supported by evidence (which
it might be noticed consumed a total of six months trial time and filled a
16,000 page record), the citing of this case for the use of judicial notice
is questionable. Mr. Justice Douglas, in his dissenting opinion, 53 states
that we should proceed on the basis of fact as to the danger, clearness,
and imminency of it. Again it must be pointed out that the Court ex-
pressly stated 54 that it was not considering what the party was and
advocated, but that the lower court considered all the evidence and found
inter alia that the Communist Party advocated the overthrow of the
government by force and violence.
VI
Congress saw fit to step in at this time by enacting the Internal Secur-
ity Act of 1950, 55 which contained provisions for control of subversive
activities in the United States, emergency detention of suspected security
risks, deportation of subversive aliens, etc. The first section50 of this Act
was a preamble containing congressional findings of necessity. This find-
ing in brief states that: there exists a world Communist movement which
by revolutionary means is attempting to establish Communist totalitar-
ian dictatorship in the countries of the world; that the Communist move-
ment in the United States is a part of this movement and is waiting for
50 Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 547 (1951).
51 Id. at 546.
52 Id. at 564-5.
53 Id. at 588-9.
54 Id. at 497-8.
55 64 STAT. 987 (1950), 50 U.S.C. § 781 et seq. (Supp. 1952).
56 Ibid.
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the time when it can overthrow the government by force and violence
and is schooling its people for this; that this is being accomplished by
Communist action organizations controlled by the communist dictator-
ship of a foreign country; that such organization, the methods and ob-
jectives and the successes of the world-wide movement itself present a
clear and present danger to the security of the United States and make
it necessary that such legislation be enacted.
The passage of this Act and the setting forth of its findings of neces-
sity have prompted many courts to conclude that a use of the doctrine
of judicial notice is warranted.57 The Supreme Court in affirming5 8 the
Carlson case, relies on the Act and the congressional findings as to the
use of force by the Communist Party to achieve control of the govern-
ment and finds therein a constitutional basis for Congress to exclude
aliens. The Court held that the Attorney General, on the authority of
the Act, can thus hold in custody without bail aliens who are Commun-
ists, such membership being in and of itself a reasonable basis for de-
tention. Mr. Justice Frankfurter for the dissent,5 9 likewise implies that
judicial notice would have done the job, stating that, in the circumstances
of today, a legislative definition of the Communist Party as an organiza-
tion advocating the violent overthrow of government made little differ-
ence in the required proof.
The only conclusion that can be drawn is that courts are increasingly
aware that judicial notice may be taken of the aims and doctrines of the
Communist Party, and that the Schneiderman and like decisions have
been impliedly if not expressly overruled. The courts, at any rate, can
now rely on a legislative determination of fact, though perhaps not with-
out dispute as was the situation in the National Maritime Union v.
Herzog case discussed supra, where the dissent 60 did not think it con-
stitutionally right for a court to base its decision on such a determination
where there was a possible abridgement of the constitutional rights of
others. Though this case was concerned with constitutionality of the Act
itself, one can agree with the dissent 61 that if the facts are as plain and
overwhelming as they are said to be then there should be no difficulty
in obtaining them through evidence. Of course, while this might be true,
it can well be a tedious, time consuming process as witness the evidence
in the Dennis case. It is on this exact point that the application of this
doctrine is advanced. Not only would the prosecution of subversives and
57 E.g., United States v. Schneiderman, 106 F. Supp. 906, 922 (S.D. Cal. 1952),
citing this Act states: "Indeed, there is persuasive argument that such is the common
notoriety of this alleged objective of the Communist Party that the courts might
properly take judicial notice of it."
58 342 U.S. 524, 535 (1952).
59 Id. at 565.
60 National Maritime Union v. Herzog, 78 F. Supp. 146, 177, 185 (1950). See
notes 28-32 supra and accompanying text.
61 Id. at 184.
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enemies of this country be greatly facilitated, but also the more efficient
administration of justice would ultimately benefit all.
The situation as it exists today was aptly summarized in Dworken v.
Cleveland Board of Education: 62
Courts now take judicial notice that whoever is a Communist is by
reason of that fact a member of an organization the international purpose
of which is to destroy the government of these United States. While our
courts were slow to come to the view, and the higher the court the slower
it came, our courts now nevertheless recognize and take judicial notice of
this fact of which our people universally took recognition long before.
VII
This conclusion, though, presents its problems. The original argu-
ments against this doctrine have been greatly dispelled. The fact that the
party has legal status in some government subdivisions has already been
commented on and disposed of by the Douds case on the basis that it is
a political party for practical purposes only and is to be treated different-
ly in law. True, the distinction must still be made between the theoretical
party trying to spread its economic theories through peaceful means and
the Communist Party with the aim of world subversion through revolu-
tionary means. As has been pointed out, one of the chief objections to the
use of this doctrine is that its application will make criminals of many
on the basis of their membership in this party. Judicial notice, without
the necessity of evidence in any short judicial or quasi-judicial proceed-
ings to show advocacy of the use of force and violence, will thus auto-
matically show a violation of many state syndicalism, anarchy, or sedi-
tion laws63 (in one form or another they prohibit the advocating of
violent overthrow of the government). In many cases convictions, if not
automatic, would be made easier. It is true that more than mere mem-
bership in a proscribed party should be required to convict a person of a
crime but some statutes are undoubtedly worded so as to make him a
felon per se by the mere fact of membership.64 Then too, many persons
will be removed from their employment in the same manner under pro-
visions of various loyalty oaths6 5 required as a prerequisite for employ-
62 42 Ohio Opin. 240, 94 N.E.2d 18, 25 (C.P. 1950), aff'd, 63 Ohio L. Abst. 10,
108 N.E.2d 103 (Ct. App.), dismissed, 156 Ohio St. 346, 102 N.E.2d 253 (1951).
63 A statistical summary of these laws as of the end of 1950 is set forth by
EMERSON AND HABER, op. cit. supra, note 17 at 403 (1952). They report: "31 states
and territories had anti-sedition laws similar to the Smith Act, 20 had criminal
syndicalism laws, 16 had criminal anarchy laws. Altogether 39 jurisdictions had one
or more of these laws on the books. In addition 34 had red flag laws. These statutes
are collected in Gellhorn, The States and Subversion, Appen. A and B (1952)."
64 See note 17 supra and accompanying text, and also discussion of Communist
Party of the United States v. Peek, 20 Cal.2d 536, 127 P.2d 889, 895-6 (1942).
65 As of 1950, in 19 states Communists are excluded from state employment, 28
states require loyalty oaths or qualifications from all employees, 20 states require
loyalty oaths of teachers, [1950] 2 U.S.C. CoNG. SERV. 3887.-See 28 NOTRE DAM
LAW. 406 (1953).
NOTES
ment as teachers or in other pursuits under state control. Such member-
ship would constitute grounds for dismissal.
Another consideration might be the anomalous situation of the state
in which the Communist Party is a legal political party6" but those party
members who advocate what judicial notice declares to be the doctrines
and aims of the party, i.e. forceful and violent overthrow of the govern-
ment, would find themselves violators of that same state's criminal
statutes discussed above. This though the party is not barred, and mem-
bership in it is legal. This is true even on a national level in the violations
of various federal sedition acts, though even the Internal Security Act,
seemingly expressly aimed at the Communist Party, states that member-
ship in the Party is not per se a crime nor a violation of any part of the
Act.
6T
An interesting query and argument against the use of this doctrine is
the question: is this really a matter of such common knowledge and so
indisputable that the standard of the doctrine can be upheld? This idea
is raised despite the utterances of courts because of such interesting facts
as these: The American Bar Association in 1951 published a small
pamphlet entitled Brief on Communism: Marxism-Leninism, to explain
why it recommends the disbarment of lawyers who are Communists. The
brief states68 that it is "evident that there is widespread ignorance and
confusion throughout the United States concerning the nature of Com-
munism." The brief goes on to say that its purpose is to acquaint the
American people with what Communism really is as regards its purposes,
aims, tactics, and practices. The American Bar Association became aware
of this misunderstanding and general ignorance during debate by its
members on its proposal. Can it be said then that there is a common
knowledge without dispute of the aims of the party or simply of what
Communism is?
The Committee on Tenure and Academic Freedom of the University of
Washington, in making its report on the cases of several faculty mem-
bers suspected of or who were admittedly Communists, was forced to say
after extensive findings that there is dispute as to whether or not the
Communists advocate change by force and violence.69 Indeed the Com-
munist Party publications relied on in the main, such as the Communist
Manifesto, were written under different conditions one hundred years
ago. Many now feel that the party in the United States has abandoned
this approach on seeing that it was unpopular and would not work here.
66 See note 64 supra.
67 64 STAT. 992 .(1950), 50 U.S.C. § 783(f) (Supp. 1952).
68 Aiuc~A BAR AssociATioN, Brief on Communism: Marxism-Leninism 3-4
(1951).
69 Uuivrisrrr oF WASm=TON, Communism and Academic Freedom 31 (1949).
(1949).
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While it is true that such change, if any, is probably Communist Party
propaganda to prevent its being outlawed and to enable it to get more
converts, still it seems that there is too much dispute to properly bring
this conclusion within the classification of judicial notice.
70
A similar conclusion might be drawn from the recent determination
71
by the New York State Board of Regents that the Communist Party is
a subversive organization advocating the overthrow of the United States
government by force and violence. To come to this decision, which courts
seemingly could arrive at in a brief number of minutes via the advocated
use of'judicial notice, the Board relied on reports of a committee which
was set up eleven and one-half months before. The necessity of a year's
hearings to reach this conclusion negates the idea of such conclusion be-
ing a matter of such common knowledge and indisputable certainty as to
warrant the application of judicial notice.
This same negation can be applied even more fully in the case of the
federal agency, the Subversive Activities Control Board, which despite
voluminous evidence, took two years and seven months to reach the same
conclusion as the Board of Regents. Under the provisions of the Internal
Security Act 72 a Subversive Activities Control Board was set up to re-
view individual cases of different organizations to determine if they are
Communist-front or Communist-action organizations as defined in the
Act. Such organizations are required to register with the Attorney Gen-
eral, and their members, after such designation, are restricted in employ-
ment opportunities, especially with regard to defense employment. The
Act was passed in September, 1950, and it took the Board until April,
1953, after the examination of voluminous records, exhibits and other
materials, to make its findings that: 73 the Communist Party is a Com-
munist-action organization nurtured by the Soviet Union in seeking to
overthrow the government of the United States, by force and violence if
necessary, and to establish a dictatorship of the proletariat with a pri-
mary objective of advancing the world Communist movement. It seems
strange that the courts are able to take judicial knowledge of a fact that
is only arrived at by a specially constituted Board after an exhaustive
examination that lasted over two and one-half years.
The party has stated that it will appeal this finding to the courts, and
so in a short time there may be a judicial pronouncement that will
give a solid basis for the actions of courts in their use of judicial notice
with regards to the aims, doctrines, and purposes of the Communist
70 The question of what is embraced in the terms "common knowledge" and
"indisputable" is properly the subject of another note.
71 N.Y. Times, Sept. 25, 1953, p. 10, col. 3-8.
72 64 STAT. 997 (1950), 50 U.S.C. § 791 (Supp. 1952).
73 N.Y. Times, April 21, 1953, p. 1, col. 2.
